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THE PROMOTER AND RULE 10b-5; BASIS FOR
ACCOUNTABILITY
John Frohlingt*
Promoters' profits have traditionally posed a troublesome problem to
American courts.' The passage of the Securities Act of 19332 (hereinafter
referred to as the 1933 act), however, introduced a powerful weapon
wholly apart from remedies which were available at common law' by
requiring disclosure of material facts by companies subject to the act.
In many instances the promoter must reveal the very transactions which
might otherwise have formed the basis for a secret profit. Still, the 1933
act is designed to secure disclosure only, and does not provide a remedy
against the promoter except- perhaps when he acts in some other capacity.' Recent developments under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 (hereinafter referred to as the 1934 act) indicate,
however, that a more direct remedy to redress promoters' secret profits
may exist. The purpose of this paper is to show that the common law
remedies protecting against promoters' excesses are inadequate; that although the problem of promoters' frauds has been largely eliminated because of the disclosure provisions of the 1933 act, where these requirements are not applicable, section 10(b) provides a remedy against the
promoter; and finally that in certain cases even where full disclosure has
been made, a remedy should exist under either state or federal law to
correct a grossly inequitable or otherwise fraudulent arrangement.
t B.S., Yale University 1955; LL.B., Georgetown Law Center 1959. Trial Attorney, Securities and Exchange Commission.
* Copyright @ 1963 John Frohling. All Rights Reserved. The Securities and Exchange
Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication by
any of its employees. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author's colleagues on the staff
of the Commission.
This paper carries an authorship date of January 1, 1963.
1 One commentator has complained: "For generations judicial remedies for promoters'
frauds and the recovery of secret profits have stood as a monument to judicial ineptitude."
Reuschlein, "Federalization-Design for Corporate Reform in a National Economy," 91
U. Pa. L. Rev. 91, 108 (1942). For a short discussion of some of the leading British cases
see Note, 28 Geo. L.J. 535 (1940).
2 48 Stat. 74 (1933) as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a.-77aa. (1958).
8 The term "common law" is used to refer to all the remedies available to corporation,
shareholder or creditor against promoters whether provided by statute or by judicial authority and is not used in its narrow or technical sense. But see Landis, Statutes and the
Sources of Law, "Harvard Legal Essays" 213, 214 (1934).
4 To ensure that these disclosure requirements have been complied with, the act also
contains remedial provisions of both a civil and criminal nature. However under the 1933
act the promoter is not liable as such. See Douglas & Bates, "Some Effects of the Securities
Act Upon Investment Banking," 1 U. Chi. L. Rev. 283, 285 n.9 (1933). For example, although § 11 of the 1933 act provides the purchaser with civil remedies against the issuer,
director of the issuer, and certain other persons signing the registration statement, the
promoter is not specifically included.
5 48 Stat. 881 (1934) as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-j (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78c-d (Supp. III, 1962).

RULE 10b-5
I.

RELIEF AT COMMON LAw

In the past, courts have not been able to develop consistent rules governing the promoter's relationship with his company.0 Considerable conflict exists as to when his duty begins and ends 7 and whether he is more an
agent s or trustee.9 It has long been recognized that the promoter performs
an important function to the corporation because his efforts may be in
large part responsible for the company's later success10 and perhaps because his profession is a hazardous one. For all this the promoter is entitled to compensation, but by the majority rule he cannot recover the
value of services performed by way of enforcing a contract of employment executed by the not-yet-created corporation1 nor even by recovery
on a quantum meruit basis. 2 Of course, as a practical matter, the promoter is not often left without compensation because the corporation,
especially where it is successful, customarily ratifies the promoter's contract.
Yet the excesses of some promoters have led courts to rule that the
promoter owes a fiduciary obligation of some sort to his company and
cannot profit unduly at its expense. Taken as a whole, however, the rules
controlling secret profits have been conflicting, leading to opposite decisions in similar factual situations, and have been largely inadequate to
deal with the problem of promoters' frauds. Only a few rules are uni6 McGowan, "Legal Controls of Corporate Promoters' Profits," 25 Geo. L.J., 269, 271-72
(1937).
7 Note, 7 U. Chi. L. Rev. 534 (1940). This factor is important because the quantum of
relief depends on whether the promoter was under a fiduciary duty when he bought the
property and later sold it to the corporation. If he purchased it before he started promoting
the company he could resell it at fair value, while if he acquired the property after his
fiduciary duty had commenced he must resell at cost. See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper
Mining & Smelting Co., 74 NJ. Eq. 457, 503, 71 At. 153, 172 (Ch. 1908).
8 See 1 Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations 419 (5th ed. 1953).
9 Yeiser v. U.S. Board & Paper Co., 107 Fed. 340, 348 (6th Cir. 1901). The strict rules
governing trusteeship however have never been applied. In the face of this almost irreconcilable conflict Professor Isaacs was prompted to say that:
[E]very attempt to fit the promoter into a common-law scheme has not only failed
but has led to embarrassment and abuses. He tries to act as agent. The courts discover
that he cannot. Call him an outsider, and you have not only a bald fiction but you
make him free to deal at arms' length with the corporation and make secret profits.
Call a halt by declaring him a fiduciary-a fiduciary with the burdens but none of the
advantages of an ordinary fiduciary. You must modify the statement and retract it at
every turn, and finally you find it leading to a recovery of secret profits that were
assented to by every one in interest, and that now can be recovered to enrich those who
were never damaged.
Isaacs, "The Promoter: A Legislative Problem," 38 Harv. L. Rev. 887, 898-99 (1927).
10 Ehrich & Bunzi, noting this importance, said: "'The corporation is in the hands of
the promoter like clay in the hands of the potter'." Ehrich & Bunzi, "Promoters' Contracts," 38 Yale L.J. 1011 (1929). See also 1 Dewing, supra note 8, at 415.
11 It is said that at the time such a contract was purportedly made there was no one
capable of making it. See Clifton v. Tomb, 21 F.2d 893, 900 (4th Cir. 1927).
12 This rule is said to be based on the fact that it is difficult to determine the value of
the promoters' services and because the corporation had no real opportunity to accept or
reject the promoters' services. See Ballantine, Corporations 113 (rev. ed. 1946).
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form.1" If innocent subscribers, purchasing directly from the corporation,
are part of the original promotion, recovery has usually been permitted.1 4
Or, if the promoter purchases all the company's shares, and later sells
them to the public himself, recovery has consistently been denied. 1
Beyond this, there is little consistency among decisions, and one is pressed
to comprehend the distinctions developed by the courts.
If the promoter purchases all the issued but not all the authorized
stock of the company, and if the company later approves the promoter's
transaction prior to the time when other shareholders are brought into
the company, the decisions are hopelessly conflicting. Some courts deny
recovery on the theory that since at the time the promoter sold his property to the company, all of the then shareholders approved of the transaction, the company should not be allowed to repudiate it.' 6 This rule,
styled the Lewisohn rule, gives controlling weight to the performance of
corporate acts and the controlling consideration of these decisions has
been, as noted, whether all the then shareholders assented to the actions
of the promoters. The Lewisohn rule has been criticized on the grounds
that "consent" where the promoter occupies both sides of the transaction
is fictitious, and that the rule sacrifices substance for form, thereby making it possible for the promoter to avoid liability by the simple process
7
of first purchasing all the company's shares.'
8
The majority of courts have either refused to follow the Lewisohn
rule, or engrafted modifications upon it even where the promoter is the
only original subscriber. Thus, if at the time the promoter subscribed to
his shares it was contemplated that subscribers would later be solicited,
recovery has been permitted even though the promoter owned the only
outstanding shares. 19 Also, if he later donated back to the corporation part
of his shares, which shares were later sold to innocent subscribers, recovery has been allowed2 ° And, indeed, some courts have even gone so
13 Note, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 746, 747 (1933).

14 See, e.g., Davis v. Las Ovas Co., 227 U.S. 80 (1913).
15 Miles Wide Copper Co. v. Piper, 29 Ariz. 129, 239 Pac. 799 (1925).
16 Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206 (1908); Ball
v. Bread, Elliot & Harrison, 294 Fed. 227 (2d Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 584 (1924).
See also Hays v. The Georgian, Inc., 280 Mass. 10, 181 N.E. 765 (1932).
17 The Lewisohn court recognized this as a possibility but failed to give any weight to
later contributions by innocent shareholders. This is especially anomalous considering that
the court looked upon an injury to the individual shareholder as the basis for the corporate
action. 210 U.S. at 211.
18 See generally Berle, "Compensation of Bankers and Promoters Through Stock Profits,"
42 Harv. L. Rev. 748 (1929); Brockelbank, "The Compensation of Promoters," 13 Ore.
L. Rev. 195 (1934); McGowan, "Legal Controls of Corporate Promoters' Profits," 25 Geo.
L.J. 269 (1937); Note, 28 Geo. L.J. 535, 540 (1940).
19 Arnold v. Searing, 78 N.J. Eq. 146, 78 Ati. 762 (Ch. 1910); 73 N.J. Eq. 262, 67 AtI. 831
(Ch. 1907) (on demurrer).
20 California-Calaveras Mining Co. v. Walls, 170 Cal. 285,- 149 Pac. 595 (1915); Torrey
v. Toledo Portland Cement Co., 158 Mich. 348, 122 N.W. 614 (1909).
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far as to repudiate Lewisohn on the same facts as were presented in that
case.21 This result is typified by the Bigelow decision which, in contrast
to Lewisohn, stands as a unique illustration of the divergence of thought
between two courts on the same problem. The Bigelow rule, although
reaching a laudable result, has itself been criticized.2 2 Nevertheless,
it represents the better rule.
But although Bigelow appears to constitute a repudiation of Lewisohn,
subsequent events cast doubt upon this conclusion, especially with regard
to the question of corporate assent when the promoters controlled the
corporation. Twenty years after Bigelow came Hays v. The Georgian,
Inc.,1 3 in which Massachusetts refused to apply the rule of the former
case in a similar factual situation.2 4 Bigelow had permitted recovery
where promoters had subscribed to all the issued but not all the authorized
stock because, the court held, the promoters' fiduciary duty extended to
subsequent sales to innocent shareholders where these sales were contemplated by the promoters. In Hays the promoters, or their agents,
purchased all the authorized stock before they resold it to the public and
recovery was denied.2 5 In both cases the corporate approval occurred
while the corporations were under the control of the promoters, and in
both cases sales' to the public were contemplated. But Hays, by refusing
recovery simply because the promoters had first purchased all the authorized stock, seemed to reject Bigelow completely by not giving controlling weight to whether the later sales had been contemplated. In
effect, Hays, no less than Lewisohn, engendered a rule based on meaning26
less technicalities that are easily circumvented.
27
In
Likewise, Lewisohn was narrowed by McCandless v. Furlaud.
this case, as in Lewisohn, the promoters had purchased all the issued but
21 Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193

(1909). See also Beal v. Smith, 46 Cal. App. 271, 189 Pac. 341 (1st Dist. 1920) ; Hollander
v. Breeze Corp., 131 N.J. Eq. 585, 26 A.2d 507 (Ch. 1941), aff'd, 131 N.J. Eq. 613, 26 A.2d
522 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942).

22 See Little, "Promoters' Frauds in the Organization of Corporations: The Old Dominion
Copper Mining Cases," 9 Ill. L. Rev. 87 (1910); Weston, "Promoters' Liability: Old
Dominion v. Bigelow," 30 Harv. L. Rev. 39 (1916). By permitting recovery to the corporation without determining who the shareholders were at the time the fraud was committed,

it is said, some shareholders who had not actually been injured were permitted to benefit

from the corporation's recovery while other persons who had been shareholders at the time
of the fraud were left to their own remedies, if indeed they had any. It has been held that
recovery by the corporation bars recovery by an innocent co-partner. Barrett v. Shambeau,
187 Minn. 430, 245 N.W. 830 (1932).
23 280 Mass. 10, 181 N.E. 765 (1932).

See Comment, 45 Yale L.J. 511, 512 (1936).
Professor Berle criticizes the rule that shareholders who have purchased directly from
the promoters should not be protected. See Berle, supra note 18, at 757-58. See also Bal24
2G

lantine, Lattin, & Jennings, Cases on Corporations 205 (2d ed. 1953).
26 See Notes, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1031 (1934); 19 Va. L. Rev. 274, 278 (1933).
27 296 U.S. 140 (1935).
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not all the authorized shares. Yet, contrary to the holding in Lewisohn,
the Supreme Court held, at least where the rights of creditors are involved, that where a promoter occupied both sides of the transaction, the
corporation was entitled to an accounting against the promoters.2 8 The
Court said, "Consent in such conditions, so far as it gives approval to
conduct in fraud of the rights of others, is a word and nothing more. It
is not in accordance with realities."2 9 Thus, a significant departure seems
to have been created, and, indeed, to some, McCandless represented an
overruling of L.ewisohn.3 This contention is not, however, fully justified. 3 1
In any event the case can hardly be looked upon as a solution to the
problem of promoters' secret profits since it failed to reject squarely the
32
Lewisohn doctrine.
Jeffs v. Utah Power & Light Co. 3 is a reminder that the incredible
array of judicially created obstacles insulating promoters still exist.
Plaintiffs, preferred shareholders, brought a shareholders' bill to recover
secret profits and to cancel common stock issued to promoters for inadequate consideration or alternatively to require the promoters to pay
full value for their shares.
Because of the promoters' profits the company, from its inception,
had obligations far exceeding its assets. Yet the court denied recovery
on a number of technical grounds. Plaintiffs were not stockholders at the
time the fraud was committed; 4 plaintiffs had not presented a "definite
allegation" of the value of the property sold by the promoters (even
though the promoter's costs were alleged) ;31 plaintiffs had not shown that
the prior owners of their shares had not previously assented to the promoters dealings; 36 since there were sufficient assets to cover plaintiffs'
28 Note, 24 Calif. L. Rev. 465, 467 (1936). See also Comment, 45 Yale L.J. 511 (1936);
Note, 31 III. L. Rev. 392 (1936).
29 McCandless v. Furlaud, supra note 27, at 160.
30 1 Hornstein, Corporation Law & Practice, § 94, n.50 (1959). For a contrary view see
Notes, 36 Colum. L. Rev. 488, 489 (1936) ; 49 Harv. L. Rev. 785 (1936); 20 Minn. L. Rev.
552, 554 (1936); 84 U. Pa. L. Rev. 409, 415-18 (1936).
31 The McCandless court specifically distinguished and left open the question of whether
.. the corporation itself at the instance of new shareholders would be permitted to disaffirm the fraud and maintain a suit in equity for appropriate relief." 296 U.S. at 160. In a
subsequent case which relied upon Lewisohn and distinguished McCandless, certiorari was
denied. Arn v. Dunnet, 93 F.2d 634 (10th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 577 (1938).
32 McCandless has been criticized because it applied the liberal Bigelow rule to creditors
without a clear declaration of whether that rule would also be applied to shareholders for
whose protection the rule was first developed. See Ballantine, Lattin, & Jennings, supra note
25, at 205.
33 136 Me. 454, 12 A.2d 592 (1940), 54 Harv. L. Rev. 139.
34 136 Me. at 465, 12 A.2d at 597.
35 Once the plaintiffs had shown that the promoters had transferred property for excessive
consideration, the burden should have shifted to the promoters to establish that they acted
fairly in dealing with the company. Compare Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co.,
3 App. Cas. 1218, 1229 (H.L. 1878).
36 136 Me. at 466, 12 A.2d at 599.
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class of stock plaintiffs had no right to complain that a more junior class
was under water; 37 and finally, plaintiffs had no right to assume that the
more junior securities represented genuine assets received by the corporation since there was no proof that plaintiffs' stock was not worth what
they had paid for it. 3"
The Jeffs holding, of course, must be considered in the factual context
from which it arose, since it involved a suit at the instance of a preferred
shareholder to recover for injuries which might be said to have more
directly injured another class but, nevertheless, the court's language is
indeed broad.
Recent Developments
Two of the most important recent cases are San Juan Uranium Corp.
v. Wolfe, 39 and Northridge Coop. Section No. 1 v. 32d Ave. Constr.
Corp.0 In the first case the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
adopted the Massachusetts or Bigelow rule by distinguishing a prior decision of the same circuit which had followed Lewisokn. In the second
case the New York Court of Appeals, although exhibiting a slight preference for the Massachusetts rule, nonetheless denied recovery on a technical ground and in effect preserved some of the distinctions developed
in earlier decisions.
In San Juan it was alleged that promoters organized a corporation and
thereafter sold stock on thlerepresentation that the corporation had paid
$25,000 cash for its sole asset, dertain mining claims. It was further
alleged 41 that in fact the Fromoters had acquired said leases for no consideration at all_and that following the sale to the pub, a check for
$25,000 was.delivered- to the-prom 6 ters who put the money to their own
use. The courfTh permitfilig recovery against the prciinoters7Fecognized
that the Massachusetts rule was the prevailing one. It noted that the
promoter has a fiduciary duty, distinguished an earlier Tenth Circuit
case42 on the grounds that the public had supplied the $25,000 which was
paid to the promoters, and held "that the technical assent of the corporation through its promoters to the deceptive transaction is no defense to
43
an action by the corporation when freed of its bonds.)
37 An important inducement to the purchase of a senior security is the extent to which
this class is cushioned by more junior securities. This is said to be reflected in the purchase
price of the security. See Note, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 139, 140 (1940) (citing Dodd, Stock Watering 19-20 (1930)).
38 136 Me. at 466, 12 A.2d at 601.
39 241 F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1957).
40 2 N.Y.2d 514, 141 N.E.2d 802, 161 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1957).
41 Since this was an appeal from the dismissal of plaintiff's action for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted these allegations were accepted as true.
42 Arn v. Dunnett, 93 F.2d 634 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 577 (1927).
43 241 F.2d at 123.
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The Northridge case presented the question of whether a corporation
which owned a cooperative apartment building could attack contracts
dealing with rent under a ground lease and construction costs, executed
between it and corporations controlled by its promoters. The Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court had ruled that allegations pertaining to contracts executed before members of the public had subscribed
should be stricken as sham, basing its holding on the view that the promoter owed, no fiduciary obligation to the corporation prior to the subscription by the tenants44 and hence was free, in effect, to engage in self
dealing. The court suggested that the promoter only owed the duty of
making full disclosure to tenants once they had subscribed for stock and
found that, since the promoters included a clause in the subscription
contracts which revealed the existence of these contracts and stated that
the subscribers had read them, the promoters' duty of disclosure had
been fulfilled. The Court of Appeals upheld the, Appellate Division, striking as sham those allegations which rested upon the promoters' acts prior
to any subscription by the tenants. In so doing the court modified the
lower court's holding by stating that it approved of it only insofar as it
was not inconsistent with the principle that if the promoter had made
sales to innocent persons as part of the promotional scheme he would be
liable.4 5 The Court of Appeals conceded that the sales to these subscribers were contemplated, but went on to hold that sufficient disclosure
had been made to them since they were made aware of the existence of the
contracts previously executed by the promoters.46 But, while the Court of
Appeals clearly introduced the concept of the Massachusetts rule as to
contemplated purchasers, it nonetheless denied recovery by deciding as a
matter of law that disclosure had been made:Iff-View of the conflicting
evidence whether the shareholders had actual notice of these contracts,
especially their terms, it is submitted that the court may have been unwise in deciding this question as a matter of law, since it permitted the
promoters to escape liability because of constructive notice of the contracts without considering whether the subscribers had knowledge of the
details of the contracts including the unreasonableness of their terms.
Pipelife Corp. v. Bedford417 is another interesting recent case. There
promoters received stock having a par value of $367,000 in return for
44 See especially Northridge Co-op Section No. 1, Inc. v. 32nd Avenue Construction Corp.,
286 App. Div. 422, 427, 142 N.Y.S.2d 534, 539-40.
45 See Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, supra note 21.
40 There was some dispute as to whether the subscribers ever saw these contracts or, more

importantly, whether they knew of their terns, especially the interests of the promoters in
the other companies. See 2 N.Y.2d at 527, 141 N.2d at 810, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
47 145 A.2d 206 (Del. Ch. 1958).
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a nonexclusive license for which they had paid no consideration. In holding the promoters liable to the extent of their secret profit, which apparently was the par value of the shares issued to them, the Delaware
Court of Chancery ruled, inter alia, that the promoters had not sustained
the burden of showing that the license was worth the value they had
assigned to it and that they had contemplated sales to the public at the
time they transferred the license to the corporation. What was significant
about Chancellor Seitz's opinion, however, was that he permitted recovery
despite the fact that the Texas Securities Commission had approved
three of the company's four stock offerings,4 8 and despite the fact that
the company had filed a notification and a copy of its offering circular
with the SEC for two of its offerings in which disclosure of the promoters'
transactions had been made.49 In rejecting these filings as conclusive
evidence of the absence of fraud, the court interestingly enough first
passed upon the adequacy of the disclosure made, implying that it was
deficient since the company did not state that the license was not worth
the value of the stock transferred to the promoters for it, even though
the promoters had disclosed that they had paid nothing for it. The court
also noted that the company had failed to disclose that the value of the
license lay in the company's abiIit--to exploit the license which the court
concluded the company was-ufinable to do. Finily, suggested Chancellor
Seitz, even assuming that adequate disclosure had been made, this would
not be binding for state law purposes. He said:
I have found that the stock was in fact issued for an inadequate consideration (in a non-arms length transaction). Consequently, the court questions
how far disclosure can be a substitute for compliance with the Delaware
Constitutional and statutory requirements that where stock is to be issued
for property, such property must have a value at least equalling the full
value of the stock. The extent of the disclosure might be persuasive in a
close value case. This is not such a case where the defendants have the
burden. 50
The case represents an unusual contrast of federal versus state control
of promoter's profits and appears to be the only case in which a state
court has suggested that disclosure made by promoters is insufficient to
bind the corporation. 1
48 The other offering was apparently not registered with the Texas Commission. The
defendants' contention, that this approval was conclusive as to value in the absence of fraud,
was denied by the Delaware court. 145 A.2d at 214-15.
49 These offerings were made pursuant to the exemption provided for by § 3(b) of the
1933 act, Reg. A. Rules 255 and 256 promulgated as part of Reg. A require an issuer to file
with the Commission a notification on Form 1-A, and a copy of its offering circular. The
company disclosed that the promoters had given no cash consideration for the license but
bad received $367,000 in par value of securities when they transferred it to the company.
50 145 A.2d at 214.
51 See also Bergeson v. Life Ins. Corp., 170 F. Supp. 150 (D. Utah 1958), aff'd in part,
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Despite a tendency in some of the more recent cases to hold the
promoter liable and to apply the more liberal Massachusetts rule, since
this rule like the Lewisohn rule is characterized and burdened by unnecessary technical distinctions, it cannot be said that either rule satisfactorily deals with the problem. It is therefore advisable to examine other
remedies to determine whether they might be utilized to permit recovery
against promoters.
II. FEDERAL SEcURITiES LAW PROTECTiON-DISCLOSURE
The disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 have eliminated to a great extent the problem of promoters' frauds. Under some
circumstances, however, these provisions have no application and it is
in these cases that section 10(b) of the 1934 act could be utilized to
protect persons purchasing stock in new companies. In addition even
where the disclosure requirements do apply there is the possibility that
some further protection would be desirable and that section 10(b) could
be the source of that protection.
Prior to the 1933 act an investor was required to rely on the almost
unrestrained 52 representations of promoters, but after passage of the
act the promoter was at least under some obligation to disclose material
facts where the registration provisions of the act applied. 53 Generally, the
1933 act protects against promoters' frauds in two ways: there are the
prophylactic effects of disclosure and the redressive provisions which
come into play once material misrepresentations or omissions of facts
have been made.5 4
Disclosure has without question greatly reduced the incidents of
fraud. 5 Many specific items of information are required to be disclosed
reversed in part, 265 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1959) (issue of promoters' profit held inapplicable
by appellate court); Gladstone v. Bennett, 153 A.2d 577 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1959) (distinguishing
Pipelife in denying recovery against promoters on finding that no fiduciary obligation existed
because full disclosure had been made); johndahl v. Columbus Trotting Ass'n, 104 Ohio App.
118, 147 N.E.2d 101 (1956) (reversing lower court which permitted recovery of a secret
profit on finding that there was inadequate evidence to show that the property transferred
to the company by the promoters was not worth the value assigned to it).
52 Although Blue Sky Laws existed when the Securities Act of 1933 was enacted, they
were not in force in all states and even in those states where they did exist they often were
not enforced effectively. Since such statutes only regulated intrastate transactions it was an
easy thing for the promoter to sell his stock in a state where there was no law at all or to
register it in a state where the law was not enforced. See Hearings on S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 322-24 (1933). See also Berger, "Real Estate Syndication: Property, Promotion, and
the Need for Protection," 69 Yale L.J. 725, 785 (1960).
53 The legislative history of the 1933 act gives strong indication that Congress was aware
of the failure in the past of promoters to make disclosure and indeed cited this failure as
one of the reasons for which the Act was passed. H.R. Rep. No. 85 to accompany H.R. 5480,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 99 (1933).
54 For extensive treatment of these latter provisions, see generally Douglas & Bates, supra
note 4; Shulman, "Civil Liability and the Securities Act," 43 Yale L.. 227 (1933).
55 Demmler, "Registration under the Securities Act of 1933," 10 Bus. Law. 42 (1954);
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by Schedule A 6 and the forms for registration promulgated thereunder.
The Commission moved quickly to utilize its powers regarding disclosure
to establish high standards.5 7 In Matter of Brandywine Brewing Co.,5 8
it was established that a determination of value made by the board of
directors of property acquired by the company, although perhaps binding
for state law purposes, was not binding on the Commission. In Continental Distillers, the Commission ruled that it was deceptive not to
disclose that the purchase price paid by a corporation was not the result
of an arms' length transaction. The Commission said:
The very least that was necessary to avoid a misleading effect in this respect
was to state, in connection with the property item on the balance sheet,
that cost was determined in a sale in which the vendor, Reynolds, was in
control of the vendee, the corporation.5 9
Another basic proposition was developed in Matter of Unity Gold Corp.,6"
which held that neither the value of shares paid to the promoter for
property transferred to the company nor paid to him for services
rendered can be treated as part of the cost of the property where these
shares were later'donated back to the company. And, although the Commission rejects the view that the value of property is fixed exclusively
by the promoters' cost or contemporaneous sales, the burden of proving
a higher value is upon the person claiming it. These early cases, discussed
in detail elsewhere,"1 have set the standards which apply even today,
with subsequent cases adding little new in the way of philosophy or
substantial change,6" except that the Commission, in the case of speculative offerings, presently requires that the speculative nature of an offering be disclosed as well as the percentage of capital contribution to be
made by the public if the issue is sold and the percentage of ownership it
will receive for this contribution.Y
Heller, "Disclosure Requirements under Federal Securities Regulation," 16 Bus. Law. 300
(1961); MacChesney, "The Securities Act and the Promoter," 25 Calif. L. Rev. 66, 78-80

(1936).
56 48 Stat. 74, 88-91 (1933), 15 U.S.C. 77aa (1958).
57 See, e.g., Matter of Snow Point Mining Co., 1 S.E.C. 311 (1936); Matter of Continental Distillers & Importers Corp., I S.E.C. 54 (1935) ; Matter of Haddam Distillers Corp.,
1 S.E.C. 37 (1934), 1 S.E.C. 48 (1934).
58 1 S.E.C. 123 (1935).
r9 Matter of Continental Distillers &Importers Corp., supra note 57, at 78.
60 1 S.E.C. 25 (1934).
61 See MacChesney, supra note 55, at 66; MacChesney & O'Brien, "Full Disclosure Under
the Securities Act," 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 133, 135-40 (1937).
62 For a recent application of these rules see Hart Oil Corp., Securities Act Rel. 4147
(1959) ; Fort Pierce Port & Terminal Co., Securities Act Rel. 3951 (1958).
63 See General Instruction D(b) for Form S-2 (cited in Isreais & Duff, When Corporations Go Public 190 (1962)). A typical statement is:
The Promoters' out-of-pocket expenses were approximately $8,000.00 for which the
said Promoters received 787,500 shares of the Company's stock of which 708,750 shares
were escrowed. After giving effect to the sale of the shares hereby offered to the public,
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The prophylactic effects of the 1933 act have received much praiseworthy comment, 4 with some authors even suggesting that the problem
of promoters' frauds has all but disappeared because the promoters'
chief weapon, secrecy, has been eliminated. 5 Insofar as the question of
promoters' profits has not recently been brought before the courts with
frequency6" this suggestion may be to a great extent true. Yet it is the
contention of the present author that the danger of promoters' fraud
still exists, and that Rule 10b-5 can be utilized with benefit in various
7
situations to combat them.6

The disclosure provisions cannot guarantee that frauds will not be
attempted"8 because these provisions do not apply to all offerings of
securities. To mention only a few exceptions, intrastate offerings are
exempt; 9 issues under $300,000,0 which comprise a substantial portion
of the financing done in this country, 7' are excluded from the registrathe purchasers thereof will have invested $486,000.00, or approximately 9838% of the
capital of the Company and will own approximately 33.10% of the voting control. The
Promoters will have contributed mining property and out-of-pocket expenses of approximately $8,000.00 to the capital of the Company and will own approximately
66.90 percent of the voting control. Should the property prove not to be a successful
operation and the Company be liquidated, the Promoters will receive 66.90 percent of
each dollar paid to the stockholders in liquidation.
Registration Statement, Olympia Mines, Inc., File No. 2-18838, p. 4 (1962).
64 1 Hornstein, Corporation § 94 (1959); McGowan, supra note 18, at 292; Note, 28 Geo.
L.f. 535 at 544-47 (1940).
65 Baker & Cary, Cases on Corporations 768 (1958).
66 See De Capriles, Business Organization, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 527, 544 (1958).
67 Recent experience in real estate syndication shows that the American investing public
still invests large sums of money in projects about which full disclosure has not been made.
See Berger, supra note 52, at 756-58. The conduct of a promoter in this area has at times
been somewhat less than satisfactory. See Bradford, "What the Investor Should Know
in Buying Real Estate Issues Today," Magazine of Wall Street 12, 56 (April 7, 1962).
68 In State v. Whiteaker, 118 Ore. 656, 661, 247 Pac. 1077, 1079 (1926) the court said:
We do. not deem it advisable to lay down any hard and fast rule to determine whether
similar offerings to the public may be sold without a license. Were we to do so, a
certain class of gentlemen of the "J. Rufus Wallingford" type--"they toil not neither do
they spin"--would lie awake nights endeavoring to conceive some devious and shadowy
way of evading the law. It is more advisable to deal with each case as it arises.
69 Section 3(a) (11) of the 1933 act. The Commission takes the position that this exemption obtains even where there were prior purchases by promoters out of state, provided such
purchases were pursuant to § 4(1) exemption. McCauley, "Intrastate Securities Transactions
Under the Federal Securities Act," 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 937, 945 (1959).
70 There have been recent attempts to amend this section to allow the permissible limit
to be increased to $500,000. See Hearings on S. 810 and S. 843, 85th Cong., 1st Seass. (1957);
S. Hearings on S. 1178, 1179, 1180, 1181 and 1182, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. (1959). In computing
the aggregate offering price under § 3(b), Rule 253(c) excludes the value of shares issued
to promoters provided these shares will not be offered to the public for a year and suitable
escrow arrangements are made. The purpose of this provision is said to be to preserve the
private offering exemption for the promoters' shares. See 1 Loss, Securities Regulations
618-19 (2d ed. 1961).
1 In 1945 there were 572 Reg. A offerings which had a total offering price of $39 million;
in 1955 there were 1628 such offerings with a total offering price of $296 million. 1 Loss,
supra note 70, at 643. In fiscal 1960 the aggregate offering price of 1049 such offerings
was $224.9 million, SEC 26 Ann. Rep. 47 (1960). Since there are no filing requirements for
offers made pursuant to § 3(a) (11), it is difficult to determine the aggregate value of said
offerings. However, the Commission in estimating the amount of "other" offering, which
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tion requirements by virtue of section 3(b) of the 1933 act (as implemented by Regulation A promulgated thereunder). Although Regulation
A, which sets out the appropriate standards for offerings made pursuant
to this exemption, provides some protection to investors in that an offering
circular is required to be delivered if a written offer is made, the same
disclosure requirements, especially with respect to financial data, which
obtain in the case of a full registration, do not apply.72 Under this exemption the issuer files a notice 73 in the regional office rather than with
the Commission's Division of Corporation Finance.
Likewise, the private placement exemption contained in section 4(1)
of the act, for which no filing requirements whatever are prescribed,
withdraws from the Commission's control a substantial amount of the
annual security financing done in this country. 74 The aggregate effect of
these exemptions and others 75 is that a relatively large percentage of the
securities sold each year are not protected by the benefit of full disclosure.
Even where the registration requirements do apply they do not preclude the possibility of fraud. The Commission cannot guarantee that
full and accurate disclosure will always be made, and indeed specifically
disclaims doing so. 70 For one thing, the Commission is unable to physically
77
verify whether that which is listed as value is honest and reasonable.
This would require a much larger staff than the Commission presently
has, especially considering the substantial increase in the number of
registrations recently filed.7 There is also the real but unfortunate possibility that the staff will simply not detect a misleading or complete
is composed chiefly of intrastate offering, states that in fiscal 1959 $254,368,000 was offered;
in fiscal 1960, $219,314,000; and in fiscal 1961, $295,535,000. SEC Statistical Bull. 17

(April 1962).

72 See Berger, supra note 52, at 764.

73 See Reg. A, Rule 255, Form I-A Notification under Reg. A. Under Reg. A some protection is afforded by the fact that promoters are required to escrow their stock for one year.
See Reg. A, Rule 253.
74 The aggregate value of the private placement during fiscal 1959 was $3,754,915,000; in

fiscal 1960 $3,496,888,000; and in fiscal 1961 $4,998,624,000. SEC Statistical Bull. 17 (April
1962). See also Berle, Power Without Property 44 (1957). The contention could be made
that in many respects such persons do not need the protection of disclosure since they are
often as sophisticated as the issuer.
75 For a discussion of other exemptions see Sargent, "Pledges & Foreclosure Rights Under

the Securities Act of 1933," 45 Va. L. Rev. 885, 887 (1959).
76 See Rule 425.

77 See Demmler, supra note 55, at 48; Heller, supra note 55, at 301, 320. See Securities
Act of 1933 § 24.
78 From July 1, 1935, until June 30, 1936, 781 registration statements were filed while
the SEC had a staff of 1077, SEC 2d Ann. Rep. 31, 61 (1936), whereas in fiscal 1960, 1628
registration statements were filed while the Commission had a staff of 980 persons, SEC 26
Ann. Rep. 35, 225 (1960). This situation had become even worse in fiscal 1961. Although
the year end totals for fiscal 1961 are not available as yet, the eight months ending
February 28, 1962, showed a total of 1550 registrations filed or 60% higher than any previous
like period. Even the market decline in May 1962 could not have prevented fiscal 1961
from being the busiest year to date. See SEC News Digest (March 23, 1962).
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failure to disclose before a particular offering of securities has been
made.
The real possibility exists therefore that disclosure will not entirely
eliminate the existence of fraud. It would appear that an additional
remedy is necessary if the public is to be fully protected against the overreaching of promoters.
III. THE PROMOTER AND SECTION 10(b)
It was demonstrated in the previous section that even though the disclosure requirements have partly eliminated frauds associated with the
issuance of securities since these 'provisions do not everywhere apply,
and since the possibility of human error and the fraudulent bent of some
promoters still exist, an additional remedy is called for. Can Rule 10b-5
provide such a remedy? 80 Can a corporation recover for alleged violations
of section 10(b); what is the substantive scope of the section; are there
procedural advantages to suing under 10(b) rather than some provisions
of the 1933 act; is the chance of recovery greater under 10(b); is there
a similarity between the facts of Hooper v. Mountain States Securities
Corp."' and the classic promoter's fraud and does this similarity suggest
that section 10(b) might apply; and finally, does disclosure eliminate
the section as a possible source of relief? In Hooper, decided under section 10(b), the court permitted the corporation to recover against former
officers who fraudulently induced the corporation to issue stock for inadequate consideration which, although not a promoter's fraud of the
classic type, does raise the question of whether section 10(b) can be
utilized to redress promoters' frauds and indicates that affirmative
answers to these questions might be called for.
An Implied Right of Action Based Upon Violation of Rule 10b-5
Is Available to the Corporation
Section 10(b) was a relatively unimportant part of the protective
scheme until the Commission adopted Rule lOb-5 in 1942. That rule
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
79 See Baker & Cary, supra note 65, at 768 (citing Matter of Breeze Corp., 131 N.J. Eq.
585, 26 A.2d 507 (Ch. 1941), aff'd, 131 N.J. Eq. 613, 26 A.2d 522 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942)).
See also Heller, supra note 55, at 301.
80 In pleading for regulation in the area of real estate syndication Professor Berger did
not consider Rule 10b-5. Supra note 52 at 725. While the present author agrees that more
comprehensive regulation is called for, Rule 10b-5 could prove helpful in providing protection before such regulation is enacted. This author does not intend to treat the application
of Rule 10b-5 to purchases or sales by insiders. See Conant, "Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares," 46 Cornell L.Q. 53 (1960).
81 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
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(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 8 2
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

Even now much of its usefulness stems from its utilization by private
persons,8 3 as opposed to the Commission itself.
Section 10(b) does not expressly provide that a private person has a
right to bring suit based on this section. Yet no case, including the very
first one to discuss this point, 4 has ever denied that this right exists. 5
This rule is in accord with the principle of.American jurisprudence that

private rights of action can be implied if a plaintiff is injured by a defendant's violation of a statute, if the statute was designed for the
protection of a class of which the plaintiff is a member.8 8 While there
may be some difference of opinion as to the basis of this action, relief

has usually been justified either on a theory that a breach of the statutory
duty constitutes negligence, 7 or that private rights can be inferred as a
matter of statutory construction. 8 Although implied iights of action had
their major development in cases where the defendant's conduct could
be characterized as negligent, perhaps the frequency with which private
actions have been recognized in situations where the defendant's activity
lacked such "flavor," and the present general acceptance that implied
rights of action, can best be justified on the theory that Congress, by
Section 10(b) is not self-executing. See Note, 42 Va. L. Rev. 537, 539 (1956).
Cf. Loss, supra note 70, at 1959.
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
The Supreme Court has yet to pass upon this question but has denied certiorari on
three courts of appeals cases which have recognized the existence of such a right. See Hooper
v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814
(1961); Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870
(1961); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952) (dictum).
86 See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916); Narramore v. Cleveland
C., C. & St. L. Ry., 96 Fed. 298 (6th Cir., 1899). Judge Taft (later Chief Justice) said in
Narramore that the intention to create civil liability should be presumed "unless it is to
be inferred from the whole purview of the Act" that it was the legislative intent to do
otherwise. 96 Fed. at 300. Compare Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., supra note 84 at 514.
In Abounader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co., 243 N.Y. 458, 465, 154 N.E. 309, 311 (1926), the
New York Court of Appeals said that the doctrine was so well known as to not be open to
question.
87 Some argue that such conduct constitutes negligence per se, Thayer, "Public Wrong &
Private Action," 27 Harv. L. Rev. 317 (1914), while others contend that it constitutes
merely evidence of negligence, Lowndes, "Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation,"
16 Minn. L. Rev. 361 (1932).
88 This view was criticized by both Professors Thayer and Lowndes but for different
reasons. Thayer called the search for unexpressed intent a dangerous business permissible
only within narrow limits. 27 Harv. L. Rev. supra note 87, at 320. Professor Lowndes
intimates that it cannot validly be done. 16 Minn. L. Rev. supra note 87, at 365 n.8.
82
83
84
85
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omitting any reference to them recognized their existence and intended
that they should exist.8 9
Under the federal securities laws, private rights of action have been
recognized under many provisions of the various acts9" principally upon
the statutory construction theory as it is embodied in the Restatement of
Torts.

91

In the first case92 which held that Rule lOb-5 supported a private right
of action, the district court, after citing the Torts Restatement, rested its
decision on the ground that:
This rule [Section 286] is more than merely a canon of statutory interpretation. The disregard of the command of a statute is a wrongful act and
a tort ....Of course, the legislature may withhold from parties injured the
right to recover damages arising by reason of violation of a statute but the
right is so fundamental and so deeply ingrained in the law that where it is
not expressly denied the intention to withhold it should appear very clearly
and plainly .... In other words, in view of the general purpose of the Act,
the mere omission of an express provision for civil liability is not sufficient
to negative what the general law implies.
Throughout the entire line of Rule lOb-5 cases which have raised the
question of private rights of action, the position of the courts has been
consistent and clear in recognizing such a right 3
89 Loss, "The SEC Proxy Rules in the Courts," 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1041, 1048 (1960).
See Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947) (holding that Communications
Act of 1934 created an implied right of action); City & County of San Francisco v. Western
Air Lines, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 216 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (holding that Federal Airport Act
did not create an implied right of action); Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229
F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956) (holding that Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 created an implied
right of action).
90 Private rights of action have been implied from various provisions of the federal
securities laws. See Dann v. Studebaker Packard, 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961) (§ 14 of the
1934 act and rules promulgated thereunder); Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944) (§ 4(a) (2) of the Holding Company Act of 1935);
Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944) (§ 6(b) of the
1934 act); Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949 (§ 17(a) of the 1933 act,
§ 15(c) (1) of the 1934 act and Rule 15cl-2 promulgated thereunder); Hawkins v. Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949) (§§ 11(d) and 17(a) of
the 1934 act and Rule 17a-5 promulgated thereunder); Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp.,
81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949) (§ 7 of the 1934 act, Regs. T and U promulgated thereunder).
91 Restatement, Torts § 286 (1934). Note, 1962 Duke L.J. 423, 433. Judge Clark, in one
of the early cases recognizing a private right of action based on a violation of a provision
of the 1934 act (Baird v. Franklin) said:
One of the primary purposes of Congress in enacting the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 was to protect the general investing pubic.... Section 2 also states that another
goal of the statute is to make the control of securities transactions "reasonably complete
and effective." If these aims are to be followed by the Act, then, if the investing public
is to be completely and effectively protected, § 6(b) must be construed as granting to
injured investors individual causes of action to enforce the statutory duties imposed
upon the exchanges.
141 F.2d at 244-45. Although this statement appears in Judge Clark's dissenting opinion the
majority agreed with him as to the existence of a private right of action.
92 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., supra note 84, at 513-14. See Note, 46 Mich. L. Rev.
680 (1948).
93 See also Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786-87 (2d Cir. 1951); Fratt
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With respect to the precise question of whether a corporation can bring
a private action based on violations of Rule 10b-5, several recent cases,
including the Hooper case, have either expressly stated that a corporation
has such a right or have recognized its existence by implication. 4
Rule 10b-5 Offers More Protection Than the Common Law
There is little question95 that Rule 10b-5 extends to circumstances not
covered by the common law,96 and that actions under this rule are not
shackled by the restrictions which attended those actionsY7 It applies to
securities traded anywhere,9 8 with arguments that face-to-face transactions were not intended to be covered being consistently rejected 9 By
the Rule's express terms it applies to both buyers and sellers, an improvement over section 17(a) of the 1933 act upon which it was
modeled.' In addition, Rule 10b-5 is not limited to frauds committed
v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953). In addition, when Congress amended § 29(b)
of the 1934 act in 1938 it imposed a statute of limitations with respect to any action based
on violations of § 15(c)(1) which, like § 10(b), does not expressly provide for a private
right of action. Thus, it is said, by imposing a statute of limitations on such actions Congress
impliedly recognized them. By parallel reasoning private rights under § 10(b) may be
similarly inferred. See Goldstein v. Grosbeck, supra note 90; Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin,
Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). Also because the express liability provisions of the
1934 act deal with special types of conduct whereas Congress intended that the act's coverage
should be reasonably complete and effective (see § 2) and because the act was intended
to provide broader relief than the common law (see § 28(a)), § 10(b) should not be construed as prohibiting actions which the common law recognized.
04 Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 814 (1961); Dauphin Corp. v. Sentinel Alarm Corp., 206 F. Supp. 432 (D. Del. 1962);
Dauphin Corp. v. Davis, 201 F. Supp. 470 (D. Del. 1962); Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall Corp.,
201 F. Supp. 466 (D. Del. 1962).
95 A recent student note seems to imply that despite express statements to the contrary,
Rule lob-5 has not afforded relief except in situations when relief would have been available
at common law. See Note, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 735, 737 n.17, 738 n.25 (1962). Insofar as that
note is meant to convey this impression, the present author takes sharp issue. The number
of cases which have permitted recovery since the adoption of Rule lob-5 gives sufficient
evidence that the lot of the common law has been improved and perhaps has caused
modification of the common law itself. See Conant, supra note 80 at 75; Note, 40 Minn. L.
Rev. 62 at 64 n.20, 75 (1955).
06 Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Speed v. Transamerica, 99 F. Supp. 808,
829, 831 (D. Del. 1951); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa.
1947). Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 89 (1943). Compare, however, Connelly v.
Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 59 (N.D.Ohio 1959). Common law made certain exceptions to
the general rule that disclosure was not required, where there was a confidential relationship
or the defendant had special knowledge unavailable to plaintiff. See Prosser, Torts 534-38
(2d ed. 1955). Curiously enough one court has held that Rule lob-5 applies only to frauds
not cognizable at common law. Beury v. Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786 (SI).W. Va. 1954); but
see 222 F.2d 464, 465 (4th Cir. 1955) (expressing disagreement with the district court in
dismissing the appeal); 54 Mich. L. Rev. 149. The lower court's holding has not been followed and there seems to be no justification whatever for doing so. See § 28 of the 1934 act.
97 See White, "From the Frying Pan into the Fire: Swindlers and the Securities Acts," 45
A.B.AJ. 129 (1959) ; Note, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 308 (1952), for a general discussion of the various
rules of the duties of disclosure imposed upon different persons under Rule 10b-5. See
Conant, supra note 80, at 53; Note, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 62 (1955).
98 Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1953).
99 E.g., Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1949).
100 It is said that one of the main purposes of promulgating the Rule was to extend
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by a broker or dealer.'' Nor is a plaintiff's recovery limited to the difference between the sale price and fair value but includes defendant's
profit. 2 Regarding the standards of disclosure created by Rule 10b-5,
although extensive treatment is beyond the purview of this paper, there
is little question that the rule has created an advantageous climate for
the suitor. It has been suggested that Rule 10b-5 has only provided relief
in situations where the common law would also have provided relief.
With the benefit of hindsight perhaps it could be said that the facts of
these cases seem to fall within the common law rules. This does not tell
the whole story, however, because there seems to be a clear difference
between Rule lob-5 and the common law.'0 A review of the leading Rule
10b-5 cases reveals that, not only is the federal rule as liberal as the most
liberal common law rule, but more important, the Rule 10b-5 cases have
avoided relying on common law authority basing their holdings instead
on new and different grounds, thus giving Rule 10b-5 the flexibility to
cover new situations as they arise. 0 4 But even assuming Rule 10b-5 has
not enlarged upon the common law from the standpoint of announcing a
broader rule of recovery, the great number of cases which have permitted recovery demonstrate that Rule 10b-S, has certainly done so in
fact perhaps by influencing the attitude of courts with respect to this
entire area of conduct. Thus, the courts applying Rule 10b-5 have, almost without exception, concentrated on the essence of the defendant's evil, and avoided adherence to useless technicalities in order to
provide protection to investors never heretofore, as a practical matter,
possible.
protection to the defrauded seller which § 17(a) of the 1933 act did not do. Securities Exch.
Act Release 3230 (1942).
101 Section 15(c) (1) of the 1934 act and Rules 15cl-1 to 15cl-9 promulgated thereunder.
102 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., supra note 96; Leech, "Transactions in Corporate
Control," 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 725, 737 n.32 (1956).
103 Note, 40 Minn. L. Rev. supra note 97. Cf. Reuschlein, "Federalization-Design for
Corporate Reform in a National Economy," 91 U. Pa. L. Rev. 91, 108-09.
104 Perhaps the only significant substantive limitation imposed upon the rule to date
relates to the problems of intracorporate affairs. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193
F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), approved in 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251
(1952); 54 Mich. L. Rev. 149 (1955); criticized'in 4 Stan. L. Rev. 308 (1952). In Birnbaum,
judge Hand speaking for the Second Circuit said:
That section [10(b)] was directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent
practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs. ...
193 F.2d 461 at 464.
Professor Loss maintains, however, that lob-5 should cover the situation where the corporation sells shares to insiders at wrongfully low price and that the dictum in Birnbaum about
fraudulent management would be irrelevant in such circumstances. III Loss, supra note 76,
at 1770-71. The absolute liability provisions of § 16 of the 1934 act, with respect to insiders'
profits, is some evidence that Congress envisioned regulation over intracorporate abuses. See
also Cochran v.. Channing Corp., Civ. No. 62-2597 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1962).
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There Are ProceduralAdvantages to Suing Under Rule 10b-5
Procedurally, Rule 10b-5 offers enough advantages over other remedies
to justify its existence. The usually longer state statute of limitations is
applied except perhaps where the action is purely equitable, 1°5 and a
use of the mails or other instrumentality of interstate commerce will
suffice to support federal jurisdiction, with no requirement of a showing
06
that the fraud occurred during the use of the interstate instrumentality.
The applicable federal service of process and venue provisions offer advantages which may often prove decisive.1 7 It has also been suggested

that once a litigant enters the federal court he is often benefited by that
court's better acquaintance with securities problems,' by a broader concept of what is a security,10 9 who is an investor,"0 and what is material.
It Is More Advantageous to Sue Under Rule 10b-5 Than to Sue
Under the Express Liability Provisions of the 1933 Act
Compared with the provisions of the 1933 act which expressly create
individual rights of action, Rule 10b-5"1 offers definite advantages." It applies to all securities whether or not registered and whether or not
exempt." 8 On the other hand both sections 11 and 12 impose specific
limitations or conditions upon a plaintiff's right to recover: sections
12(1) and 12(2) require privity; section 12(2) and section 11 do not
provide relief if it is shown that the plaintiff knew that the defendant's
statement was untrue;" 4 under these same sections if a defendant (other
105 Compare § 13 of the 1933 act. Actions under §§ 11 and 12(2) must be brought within
one year after the untrue statement is discovered; under § 12(1) within one year after the
violation; and in no event may any action under either section be brought under these
sections after three years. See, e.g., Errion v. Conneli, 236 F.2d 447 (9th cir. 1956) ; Northern
Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. I1. 1952).
100 See, however, Boone v. Baugh, Court of Appeals, 308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962).
107 Note, 40 Minn. L. Rev. supra note 95, at 76. See also Note, 1962 Duke L.J. 151, 159.
108 See White, supra note 97, at 131.
109 See Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 925
(1954). Compare Berger, "Real Estate Syndication: Property, Promotion, and the Need for
Protection," 69 Yale LJ. 725, 775.
110 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
111 Although there are occasional statements to the contrary, Osborne v. Mallory, 86
F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), § 17(a) probably does support an implied right of action
and the Commission has urged this view. Brief for SEC, as amicus curiae, Fratt v.
Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
,
112 In only a few respects is § 10(b) perhaps less desirable than the express liability
provisions of the 1933 act. Under § lob-5 it is necessary to prove fraud, whereas under
§ 12(2) it is not. See Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Whereas under
§ 12(2) it is not necessary to prove causation, apparently it is under 10b-5. See II Restatement, Torts, § 286 (1934); Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (D. Mass.
1949) ; Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 239, 245 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944) ;
cf. Downing v. Howard, 162 F.2d.654, 658 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 818 (1947).
113 See Note, 59 Yale L.J. 1120 (1950). The provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 provide protection comparable to the express liability provisions of the 1933 act (§§ 11,
12), or to Rule 10b-5. Compare however § 15(c) of the 1934 act.
114 Robinson v. Difford, 92 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Pa. 1950); see 78 Cong. Rec. 7861,
8296 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Steiwer).
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than an issuer) can show that he did not know, and could not (in the exercise of reasonable care) have known, that his statement was untrue, he
will not be liable. Additionally, under section 11 the plaintiff can be required to post security of costs, including reasonable attorney's fees. 11
Despite the seemingly broad potential of sections 11 and 12, there is
some indication that the limitations just referred to constitute substantial
barriers to the buyer-plaintiff. Only infrequently have plaintiffs succeeded in recovering in actions based on these sections. In 1940 it was
reported that until then only twenty-seven cases had been brought under
these sections of which plaintiffs were successful in only four."' In 1961
7
Professor Loss reported a similar scarcity of plaintiff victories.1
In contrast to the restrictions attendant upon sections 11 and 12,
suits under Rule lOb-5 are generally thought to be free of many of these
limitations. This question, of course, is not settled, and difficult questions
are raised and inconsistencies produced regardless of which of the differing views is taken. Essentially, the question is whether persons who assert an implied right under Rule 10b-5 should be afforded the same or
better treatment than persons suing under sections 11 or 12 which expressly confer private rights of action."8 Professor Loss, in commenting
on one phase of this problem, has said:" 9
The courts were thus faced with a choice of dilemmas: Should they permit
buyers to sue under 10b-5 and thus ignore the safeguards which Congress
chose to throw around buyers' actions in §§ .11 and 12? Or should they
restrict the Kardon doctrine to suits by sellers (or at any rate, non-buyers)
and thus treat the seller's stepchild far better than the buyer's favorite
son-not to mention the fact that any discrimination
between seller and
120
buyer would fly in the face of § 10b and the rule?
Obviously, if the limitations of sections 11 and 12 apply to all actions
115 This provision, it is thought, might also apply to actions under § 12. See Note, 59
Yale L.J. 1120, 1127 n.44 (1950). In McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961), it was held that neither the New Jersey nor Pennsylvania
security of expenses provisions applied to federally created implied rights of action.
116 Note, 59 Yale L.J. 1120, 1126 n.40 (1950).
117 Loss, supra note 70, at 1684-92. It is reported that as of then, 77 cases had been
brought under §§ 11 and 12 of which only 12 ended in verdicts for the plaintiff.
118 Some say that these limitations should apply when a buyer sues under Rule 10b-S,
others say that they should apply to sellers' actions with buyers having no rights at all
under lOb-5, and still others urge that these limitations should apply when both the
seller and the buyer sue under the rule.
119 Loss, supra note 70, at 1780. See Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 273 (9th Cir. 1961),
followed in Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall Corp., 201 F. Supp. 466 (D.Del. 1962).
120 The Commission has argued that where the scheme alleged was only a technical violation of Rule 10b-5 but was "most essentially" within the scope of other statutory provisions
which, in expressly dealing with the specific type of security transaction involved, provide
specific private remedies, the procedural limitations and substantive defenses should be read
into the rule 10b-5 action. SEC Supplemental Reply Memorandum. Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951) 37. Thus, the Commission urged in its brief that Montague v. Electric Corp., 76 F. Supp. 933 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), and Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft
Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948), had been correctly decided. Id. at 39-40.

1963]

RULE 10b-5

under Rule 10b-5, the rule's chief utility would be limited principally to
providing the seller a right of action. Yet, without respect to the merits
of the contrary views, the weight of authority is inclined toward the
position that the restrictions of sections 11 and 12 are not applicable to
Rule 10b-5 actions. 121 Since the question has not been finally decided it
still poses a possible threat to the broad interpretation otherwise given
to Rule 10b-5, especially since no matter which view is adopted anomalies
22
are necessarily created.1
The Hooper v. Mountain States Doctrine-Relief from
Promoters' Fraud Where Disclosure Is not Made
Until Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp.,123 no court, in a Rule
10b-5 action, had permitted recovery to a corporation which, induced by
fraud, had issued stock in exchange for overvalued property. 24 In
Hooper, however, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did just that. In
addition, it did so in an opinion broad enough to encompass the typical
promoter's fraud situation.
Beif Jack Cage, the controlling stockholder and organizer of Consolidated American Indutries, Inc., as a condition of new management
taking control, severed his connection with Consolidated on October 18,
1956. Shortly thereafter he carried out a scheme, with the aid of others,
whereby he was to fraudulently obtain 700,000 shares of stock from
Consolidated. To carry out his plan he obtained the right to purchase
stock in a certain Cuban insurance company and also acquired certain
exploration rights in the Honduras. 2 5 Before he was able to acquire these
rights, however, it was necessary to forward $10,000 to Cuba. To ac121 Compare Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir.
1952), and Montague v. Electronic Corp., supra note 120, with Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Banker's Bond Co.,
187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom.
Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, U.S. Ct. of Appeals, 4th Cir., Aug. 7, 1961;
Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall Corp., 201 F. Supp. 466 (D. Del. 1962). See generally Comment,
4 Stan. L. Rev. 308 (1952); Cary, Book Review, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 857, 861 (1962).
12 See also Donovan, Inc. v. Taylor, 136 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Cal. 1955); Latty, "The
Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close Corporation Under the S.E.C.
Statutes," 18 Law & Contemp. Prob. 505, 512-15 (1953).
123 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
124 Previous to this corporations in their capacity as investors have been permitted 'to
recover under Rule 10b-S. See Note, 13 Stan. L. Rev. 378 (1961). Compare Slavin v.
Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799, 805-06 (3d Cir. 1949). In a somewhat similar situation the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held, in Howard v. Furst, 238 F.2d 790 (1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957), that Congress had not intended to protect the corporation
against violations of the Commission's proxy rules. It is not contended here that Howard
should control cases under Rule 10b-5 and indeed there are good reasons why it should not.
See Brief for SEC as amicus curiae, 1 pp. 13-14, Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp.
282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961). See also Brown v. Bullock,
294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961) (dissenting opinion). Yet the lower court in the instant case
denied relief solely on the authority of Howard.
125 It can be assumed that these properties had little or no value.
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complish this he represented to Consolidated's new management that
Consolidated already owned this stock in the Cuban company and that
$10,000 was desperately needed in order to protect Consolidated's interests. Consolidated forwarded the money. Then, through a corporate
intermediary, Mid-Atlantic, 6 Cage transferred these newly acquired
properties to Consolidated for 700,000 shares of the company's stock
having a. market value of $700,000. In order to effect this transfer, still
suspicious that Consolidated's new management would not transfer the
stock to him, Cage and Consolidated's former general counsel and its
former secretary falsified certain documents purporting to approve the
transaction just as Cage had represented it to be to Consolidated's new
management.'7 On the strength of these documents Consolidated's transfer agent delivered the shares to Mid-Atlantic, most of which were then
sold to the public by Cage and his associates.
The district court dismissed plaintiff's complaint holding that section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 did not create a right of recovery for the corporation. 28 The court of appeals reversed, holding that even though the
Mid-Atlantic Development Co. was organized solely for this purpose.
The secretary falsely certified corporate resolutions which purported to approve of
this transaction as of October 18 although these resolutions were not written until December.
128 Prior to Hooper the contention that the corporation should have a right to recover
under Rule lob-5 where it sues other than as an investor was raised in Slavin v. Germantown
Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1949). In this case the principal salesman of a mutual
insurance company, Rosenlund, acquired the right to purchase some 17,500 shares of stock
in a new company which the mutual insurance company planned to create by converting to
a stock company. In arranging for this conversion the mutual company adopted a policy
that the new stock company should not be dominated by a few large stockholders but
rather that its ownership should be spread widely with each shareholder being restricted
to only a moderate-size holding. Pursuant thereto they asked the holders of large policies
in the old mutual company to waive their preemptive right to purchase shares in the new
stock company wherever the large policy holders were entitled to receive more than 1,000
shares. Rosenlund, as the broker for certain large clients of the mutual company, had been
asked to obtain waivers from his clients, which he did. However, in so doing he discovered
that many of his clients were not interested in acquiring stock in the new stock company.
Therefore, he persuaded some of his clients to assign their right to acquire stock to him. In
this way he amassed the right to purchase some 17,500 shares. However, not until just
before the conversion of the mutual company was to take place did Rosenlund disclose to
the mutual company that he had acquired the right to purchase so many shares. Nonetheless, Rosenlund's acquisition of the rights was approved by the stockholders and directors
before the conversion and he purchased the stock paying the same value paid by other
subscribers. By acquiring these shares Rosenlund acquired control of the new stock company
and incidentally made a substantial profit. The majority of the Third Circuit found that
since Rosenlund had paid full price for the stock the question of promoters' profits was
"inapposite," and otherwise denied recovery. In his dissenting opinion, however, which is
particularly interesting in view of Hooper, Chief Judge Biggs reasoned that, although the
court could have decided, the case on the question of state law on a theory of a breach of
fiduciary duty (citing Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933)), Rosenlund's acts violated
Rule 10b-6 and the corporation should be given a right to recover. On this point he said:
It is clear that the right of the new corporation, Germantown, qua corporation as
distinguished from its stockholders, to maintain a suit such as that at bar does not
stand or fall on the issue of whether or not there was some breach of fiduciary duty by
Roseniund. The right of the corporation to maintain a suit such as that at bar arises
under the statute and the rule of the Commission. If Rosenlund's course of conduct
126
127
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corporation was not an "investor" within the meaning of section 10(b),
Congress authorized the Commission to promulgate rules not only for
the protection of investors but also those appropriate to the public interest. The court had little difficulty in finding that it was in the public
interest to permit the corporation to recover and noted:
[T] he broad purpose of this legislation was to keep the channels of interstate commerce, the mail, and national security exchanges pure from fraudulent schemes, tricks, devices, and all forms of manipulation. Just as obviously those sought to be protected were the very persons who would
be engaged in buying and selling and trading in corporate securities as
broadly defined in the Act. Certainly a person who parts with stock owned
by him as the result of fraudulent practices wrought on him by his purchaser sustains an adverse impact
that differentiates him from the damage
129
suffered by the public generally.
In Hooper the defendants-appellees had argued that recovery should be
denied because the corporation had suffered no loss by virtue of Cage's
transaction. The court rejected this contention saying:
Even in our remote position, we would be blind to all we hear and read
about were we to succumb to the artificial contention that the issuance of
this stock made the corporation no poorer so that the only persons who
suffered were the stockholders for whom the suit cannot be brought by
the Trustee.. .. [T]he thing of value transferred in exchange for assets
or the capital stock of the enterprise being acquired is the capital stock of
the acquiring corporation. Considering the purpose of this legislation,
it would be unrealistic to say that a corporation having the capacity to
acquire $700,000 worth of assets for its 700,000 shares of stock has suffered no loss if what it gave up was $700,000 but what it got was zero.' 30
Finally, appellees urged that the corporation had an adequate remedy
under state law which permitted the corporation to recover up to the
par value of the shares issued. The court also rejected this position
noting that:
[The corporation] is not confined to a mere cancellation of that stock nor
subjected to the expense of multiple litigation against a large number of
holders (many perhaps innocent) to assert a claim for the nominal par
value (1l) of this stock, the successful recovery of which would net
$7000 not what 700,000 shares would have purchased. 131
The Hooper case is interesting because it raises the question of whether
Rule 10b-5 can be utilized to redress promoters' frauds. The three phases
was prohibited by the statute and the rule, the corporation could maintain the suit
at bar.
174 F.2d at 813. The majority did recognize that under proper circumstances a corporation
might be able to recover under Rule 10b-5 but since, in this case, the corporation had not
been injured, Rule lob-5 could not support recovery.
129 282 F.2d at 202.
130 Id at 203. See also id. at 204, 207, 208.
'3' Id. at 208.
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of the case quoted above seem to indicate that Rule 10b-5 could well serve
to redress promoters' wrongs of the conventional type. And as we have
seen such a remedy would of course be broader than the common law. 8 '
By holding that Rule lOb-5 creates a right of recovery for a corporation where, by reason of a fraud, it is induced to issue securities in exchange for property, the court, in effect, announced a holding which
encompassed the essential features of a promoters' fraud. True, defendants' conduct in Hooper was not a classic example of a promoters'
fraud because in such cases the promoter usually controls the corporation and defrauds the corporation by issuing stock to himself in exchange
for property at excessive consideration through the controlled board. In
Hooper there was at most only forged approval by a board of directors.
Yet this difference should not be controlling. The essential elements of
both the Hooper case and that of the promoters' fraud are practically
identical, i.e., the employment of fraud, to have stock issued, for inadequate consideration. All are adequately covered by the Hooper opinion. Once more, the method whereby fraud is perpetrated should not
determine whether relief is to be granted when action is nonetheless
fraudulent. In keeping with this philosophy, fraud, within the meaning
of the federal securities acts, has been broadly interpreted to cover the
myriad of forms which it has assumed. 13 3 The Hooper court's statement
to the effect that Rule 10b-5 greatly expands the protection "so hemmed
in by the traditional concepts of common law misrepresentation and
deceit" indicates that this court had no intention of departing from this
philosophy. 4
Once it is determined that the corporation has a right to recover under
Rule 10b-5, the limitations and restrictions of earlier promoter fraud
cases should be inapposite. Thus the corporate consent doctrine which
had been employed to prevent recovery where the promoter had transferred property to a company within his control should no longer apply.
By following the view that fraud, within the meaning of the securities
acts, is not limited to cases of common law deceit nor even to traditional
concepts of fiduciary relationships,' 35 Rule 10b-5 should readily permit
132 Although relief was probably available at common law under these facts, the opinion
did not restrict itself to such principles in granting relief. Hence the availability of relief
at common law should not be considered conclusive on the issue of whether Rule lob-5
is broader than the common law.
133 Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
786 (1944); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1961),
aff'd, 306 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1962) (en banc) (dissenting opinion); petition for cert. filed, 31
U.S.L. Week 3187 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1962); granted, Jan. 21, 1963.
134 282 F.2d at 201.
135 See Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 799, 814 (3d Cir. 1949) (dissenting
opinion); see also Ward LaFrance Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943); Matter of Cady,
Roberts & Co., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. fI 76, 803 (Nov. 8, 1961).
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an inquiry into whether the corporation, as newly constituted, was treated
fairly even assuming some disclosure had been made to a controlled
board. 136 The Tooper court did indeed seem to seize upon the defendants'
fraudulent action, so that even though that case did not involve a question
of consent it should be persuasive where the issue is presented. Consent
where the promoter is on both sides of the transaction is nothing more
than a sham; Rule 10b-5 is certainly broad enough to permit recovery
if it results in a fraud upon the company.
Another interesting aspect of Hooper was that the court rejected appellees' argument that the watered stock remedy available to the corporation under state law was adequate.3 7 The court realistically held that
a cancellation of the shares issued to Cage and his associates or a recovery of up to the par value of the stock issued would not adequately
recoup the company's loss. 18 8 Consequently, recovery of the market value
of the shares issued was allowed without need to show that the corporation could have otherwise sold these shares, or even assuming it could,
that they could have all been sold at the then current market price. Arguments similar to the one advanced by the Hooper court had not always
been persuasive in the past. Piggly Wiggly Delaware, Inc. v. Bartlett,
serves as one example. 13

9

In that case promoters transferred property to

a corporation which had cost them $1,000. In return they received all
the company's no par stock and preferred stock which they thereafter
sold to the public. They retained the proceeds from the sale of no par
common for themselves making a substantial profit. Professor Ballantine
thinks that this case was wrongly decided and that one of the bases upon
which relief could have been granted was the injury to the corporation by
being "deprived of the capital which it might have realized by the honest
sale of the common shares." 4 There seems little difference in result to
136 See Pipelife Corp. v. Bedford, 145 A.2d 206 (Del. Ch. 1958).
137 Brief for Appellee, Mountain States S.E.C. Corp. p. 12, Brief for Appellee, Reid, p. 16.
Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (1960).
138 An action to recover promoter's secret profits is distinguishable from a watered stock
action in that recovery is limited to par value in the latter remedy, while in the former
the promoter is liable to the full extent of his profit. Yet virtually all the early cases measured
the promoters' profit in terms of the aggregate par value of securities issued to the promoter.
But see McCandless v. Furlaud, 296 U.S. 140 (1935). Of course, there is historical justification
for this because when these cases were decided, par value was more nearly equal to market
value. Still there is some question whether the courts today would gauge the promoters' profit
by market value or by par value. Also the promoter was usually able to escape liability if
he issued no par shares, see Ballantine, Lattin & Jennings, Cases on Corporations 217-20 (2d
ed. 1953), so this problem cannot be totally divorced from par value. On the other hand
the Hooper court squarely faced this issue and decided that the market value was the
proper measure of recovery.
139 97 N.J. Eq. 469, 129 At. 413 (Ch. 1925) cf. Jeffs v. Utah Power & Light Co., 136 Me.
454, 472 12 A.2d 592, 601 (1940).
140 Ballantine, supra note 138, at 842. See Baker & Cary, Cases on Corporations 776
(1958).
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corporation, shareholder, or promoter between the conduct prohibited
in Hooper and that sanctioned in Piggly Wiggly except perhaps that no
par stock was involved in the earlier case.14
A comparison of Hooper and the early promoter fraud cases offers
hope that a significant advance has been made. Under both the Lewisohn
and Bigelow rules the courts deny relief if the promoters conform to
certain seemingly unimportant rituals concerning the issuance of stock.
The Lewisohn rule denies recovery merely because the promoters own
all the issued stock when they transfer their property to the company,
despite the fact that no disclosure is later made when innocent shareholders purchase the previously unissued stock. The Bigelow rule, as restricted by Hzys, permits the promoter to escape liability if he first purchases all the company's stock regardless of whether he later makes
disclosure to innocent subscribers. Obviously, under both rules excessive
deference is paid to technical transactions with little emphasis on the
essence of the promoter's scheme.
Conversely, the broad interpretation of the Hooper court, the other
interpretations of the rule covering a wide range of situations, and its
freedom from technical distinctions at this time, support the conclusion
that Rule 10b-5 could apply to the traditional promoter's fraud especially
where the disclosure requirements do not apply or are not complied with.
Although there are no other Rule 10b-5 cases similar to Hooper, there
are other recent cases which indicate a willingness to interpret Rule
10b-5 broadly to cover the various factual situations to which the rule
has been applied. Thus in Ellis v. Carter,'42 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff could recover under Rule lob-5 where
he purchased stock from one of the defendants at a price exceeding the
then market price, where the defendant did not disclose this fact, and
where it was represented to him that the shares had voting rights when
they in fact had none.
In Matheson v. Armburst,143 the same court followed Fischman v.
Raytheon Mfg. Co.:' by holding that section 10(b) created a right of
action in a buyer notwithstanding the fact that the acts alleged might
also have violated other sections of the act. The defendant had sold the
entire stock of a company to the plaintiff and in so doing had grossly
misrepresented the company's financial condition. The court rejected an
141 Some courts of course had permitted recovery based on an injury similar to this
but the overwhelming majority refused to recognize a right based on this wrong because it
would seem this injury would necessarily be present in most cases.
142 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
:43 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1961).
144 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
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argument that because the acts complained of constituted a fraud at
common law the plaintiff had a remedy under state law and therefore
could not sue under section 10(b)."' On the question of whether an
instrumentality of interstate commerce had been used, the court ruled
that a lofig distance telephone call, made before the final negotiations
started simply to induce the plaintiff to return to Oregon where the
fraudulent statements were made, was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on
the federal courts.
In Errion v. Connell4 the same court of appeals held that section
10(b) applied where the defendants fraudulently induced the plaintiff,
by misrepresenting the value of their property, to exchange her securities
and other property for their property. This case for the first time decided
that Rule 10b-5 applied even though the fraud did not concern the value
of the securities but rather the value of property which was given by
defendants in exchange for securities 47 These cases, and others which
have previously applied Rule 10b-5 to abuses of the close corporation
and to so called private dealings, indicate that courts would be justified
in applying the rule to redress promoters' abuses. This would be in keeping with the purpose of the Exchange Act since such abuses frequently
involve the public or wide distribution of securities.
Rule 10b-5 Could Be Applied Even Though
Disclosure Has Been Made
The crucial question here, assuming the arrangement fostered by the
promoter is fundamentally unfair, is whether disclosure will insulate the
promoter against liability if there is a remedy available against him
under Rule 10b-5.
In the past the overwhelming tendency has been to permit a transaction to stand no matter how inherently unfair it might be as long as
disclosure has been made. Of course the disclosure requirements have
a salutory effect but if the arrangement is unfair in an economic sense or
constitutes a fraud in the more traditional sense, should the promoter be
protected? 48
145 Compare Beury v. Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.W. Va. 1954), appeal dismissed,
222 F. 2d 464 (4th Cir. 1955).
146 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956), 9 Stan. L. Rev. 589 (1957), 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1309

(1957).

147 Somewhat similar facts were alleged in Dauphin Corp. v. Redwall Corp., 201 F. Supp.
466 (D. Del. 1962), where, however, the fraud went to the value of a note and real estate,
which was the only property in back of the note, which was given in exchange for a
corporation's securities.
148 This is the area of "semifrauds." Graham & Dodd, Security Analysis 657 (2d ed. 1940).
After a shift from the bizarre blue sky fraud the promoter is now able to sell property to
the public worth $1 for $5 and the "law can be obeyed and the public exploited just the
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The importance of the public investment contribution to the development of new business 149 cannot be overemphasized, 50 as a quick look at
the development of the electronics industry will clearly demonstrate. Historically new businesses have experienced difficulty in obtaining necessary financing especially from institutional lenders. This fact was clearly
recognized with the passage of the Small Business Act of 1958.151 New
businesses are more dependent upon the public investor than are more
established firms, 152 so that any conditions which would unnecessarily
same." Professors Graham and Dodd suggest, as the means of correcting this condition, that
the securities laws should be amended so as to prohibit investment by the public in "unseasoned securities." This recommendation constitutes a drastic approach and is contrary
to the basic philosophy of the federal securities laws which reserves to the individual the
decision of whether or not to invest in a particular security. In addition, the alternative
means of financing new business, which is suggested by the authors, (acquiring capital
from a small number of private persons who can protect their investment by keeping in
close touch with the promotion) may prove increasingly more difficult in the future. See
note 152, infra.
'49 Graham & Dodd, supra note 148, at 656. The material referred to in this paper which
was contained in Graham & Dodd's second edition was not treated in the authors' third
edition in 1951 in order to make possible treatment of other material which posed more
important current problems to stockholders, since the creation of the SEC had largely
eliminated these old abuses. See preface to third edition.
150 Firms under three years of age normally account for 1/5 to 1/4 of the number of
operating businesses in this country. Bridges, "The Financing of Investment by New Firms,"
Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Conference on Research in Bus. Fin. 65. (1952).
-15 Hearing on Credit needs of Small Business before, Committee on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 93, 168, 198, 209 (1957).
152 A comparatively recent study by McHugh & Ciasco, "External Financing of
Small-and-Medium-Size Business," Survey of Current Business 15 (October 1955), shows
that new firms rely primarily on banks for their external funds but must rely more on
friends and acquaintances than do old firms. Because of the absence of past earnings and
the likelihood of low profits or even losses during the first years old firms are able to rely
more on organized security markets to obtain funds from external sources than are new
firms; new businesses which sought to obtain 13% of their total financing from the sale of
equities were able only to obtain less than half of their needs, and, compared with more
established firms, they sought 1/3 more equity financing. See also H. R. Hearings on Various
Bills to Amend the Small Business Act, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 70-71 (1957). Somewhat different
results were reported in Small Business Financing, Fed. Reserve Bull. 8, 12, 17 (Jan. 1961).
Other studies of recent trends in capital formation show that new corporations find it more
desirable to obtain financing from internal sources and not external sources, Kuznets, Capital
in the American Economy 282 (1961), but that of this external financing a greater percentage
now comes from the issuance of stock (as opposed to other forms of long term financing),
Creamer, Dobrovolsky & Borenstein, Capital in Manufacturing and Mining 145-46 (1960).
Considering these trends in conjunction with the reduction in the individual's financial capacity wrought primarily by the present tax structure and the present saving habits of
individals brought on by changes in the nature of our economy, it is questionable whether
sufficient financing can be obtained from private sources. See Kalmbach, "Free Enterprise
in a Changing World," 14 Mich. Bus. Rev. 1, 5 (1962). Incomes are tending to become
more equalized and fewer persons conduct their own enterprises. Thus now more individuals
tend to divert savings to institutions which might otherwise have gone into new businesses.
Kuznets, supra at 422-23. See also Berle, Power Without Property 32-34 (1958). As a result,
these institutions are more important now as a source of capital then they have ever
previously been and control a substantial percentage of the country's financing. Kuznets,
supra at 421-22. However, institutions generally prefer "blue chips" to speculative securities.
Berle, supra at 54. Goldsmith, "The Share of Financial Intermediaries in the National
Wealth and National Assets, 1900-1949," Occasional Paper 42, p. 16, Nat. Bureau of
Econ. Research (1954). Even if they were to change and become more willing to invest
in new businesses there is still some reason to doubt that they would actively check the
promoters' excesses, judging from their past activities with regard to participation in the
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obstruct the flow of capital into this area, such as an unreasonably high
return for promoters or the frequent occurrence of fraud, should be
eliminated if possible. Typically, the relatively unsophisticated investor
is called upon to contribute t6 new firms. For the small and new business
it is essential to obtain financing in order to expand.
A dichotomy of thought has existed as to the effect a purchase of
shares should have if full disclosure has been made in the offering
circular. Professor Berle contends that the notice contained in the
broker's circular should bind incoming shareholders to the promoter's
deal.Y8 On the other hand Professor Ballantine has criticized this view
and said:
It is surprising that Mr. Berle should suggest making such constructive
notice to the defrauded shareholders sufficient and binding upon them by
law. It has been suggested by the Massachusetts court that "A profit is not
secret or unlawful if all the parties having a direct interest know of it and
assent to it, or do not repudiate it." Insofar as this is an intimation that
disclosure to shareholders, after a secret profit-taking, calls for affirmative
repudiation or recission on their part to prevent an implied assent or ratification, it seems clearly unjust and unsound, a doctrine favorable to the
wrongdoers.154
Clearly the question could be asked whether, even though an issuer has
satisfied the requirements of the 1933 act, the corporation is bound to
accept the promoter's deal or is able to repudiate the deal once the
promoter and those controlled by him have disassociated themselves from
the company. 5 5 The disclosure requirements have a specific purpose
and in some respects represent a limited approach to the underlying
purpose of the flotation of securities, notably the formation of capital.
Hence it has been suggested that these provisions, even though supported
by civil and criminal sanctions, fall short of providing adequate protection
to the public. It is the opinion of Professors Graham and Dodd that a
management of the companies whose securities they hold. Livingston, The American Stockholder ch. 12 (1958). Thus, the alternative offered by Graham & Dodd might not be a
realistic one.
153 The New York Stock Exchange has stated that the underwriting of small issues has
made a substantial contribution to our economy. N.Y. Stock Exch. MF. Education Circ.

No. 152 (Dec. 26, 1961). It was reported in 1958 that even though 13.5% of the small
businesses desired equity capital only 4 of these attempted to acquire it, the others making
no effort because they assumed they could not obtain it. "Small Business Financing," 52
Fed. Reserve Bull. 12-13 (Jan. 1961). Berle, "Compensation of Bankers and Promoters
Through Stock Profits," 42 Harv. L. Rev. 748, 760 (1929).
154 Ballantine Corporations 833 (Rev. ed. 1946).
155 It has been held with considerable soundness by a strong minority voice that a
bona fide approval by the majority can bind the minority. See S. Solomont & Sons
Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 93 N.E.2d 241 (1950);
see Landstorm, "Ratification by Majority Stockholders-A Problem in Corporate
Democracy," 31 B.U.L. Rev. 165 (1951). It is enough to say here that under the Solomont
rule approval must be reasonable such as obtains from a proxy contest. 31 B.U.L. Rev. at
178; Lattin, Corporations 355 (1959).
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tightening of federal and state regulations only led to the semi-fraud
where one could obey the law but at the same time exploit the public
(provided no false representations are made) by selling stock at an excessive price. 156 Professor Douglas (now Justice) early recognized that
disclosure was in a bfoad sense inadequate and represented only a
limited attempt to correct a broad wrong. 157
More recently Livingston has recounted instances (in a somewhat different setting) where full disclosure was made but the public exploited
nonetheless.' 5 The problem is essentially whether disclosure should be
used as a means to insulate the promoter especially where a grossly unfair financing arrangement is contemplated. True, if disclosure is made,
most of the essential information about the company supposedly has been
made available. But is this disclosure enough, especially considering that
the average American investor is not especially sophisticated and may not
understand the data disclosed anyway.' 59 These practical considerations
should not be overlooked with regard to promotional issues especially if
respectable brokers, who are often thought to protect the unsuspecting
public, are reluctant to participate,' 60 and even if disclosure is made this
156 Graham & Dodd, supra note 148, at 657. Earlier these authors offered that "The
great majority of such flotations [public sale of securities in new enterprises) were either
downright swindles or closely equivalent thereto by reason of the unconscionable financing
charges taken out of the price paid by the public." Id. at 651.
157 Douglas & Bates, "The Federal Securities Act of 1933," 43 Yale L.J. 171, 172 (1933).
The answer given by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. to this question
has been no, at least in several important instances. The NASD has taken the position that
despite disclosure it is unfair for an issuer to withould shares from the public during an
offering. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III § 1. See interpretation entitled "Free Riding
and Withholding," NASD Manual pp. G23-G31 (promulgated April 1, 1960), as interpreted
in Notice to Members of NASD (Oct. 13, 1961). Likewise the NASD retains the right to
review compensation by underwriters in the sale of unseasoned securities irrespective of
disclosure and with respect to mark-up in the price of a security disclosure itself does not
justify a price which is unfair or excessive in the light of all other relevant circumstances.
Interpretation of art. III, §§ 1 & 4 of Rules of Fair Practice. See "Issues of Unseasoned
Companies--Underwriting Compensation-Withholding," Notice to Members of NASD
(Dec. 26, 1961) ; Letter to Members (Jan. 11, 1962).
158 Livingston, The American Stockholder 173 (1958).
159 A survey by the Opinion Research Corp., "Overcoming Word Barriers in Stockholder Communications," The Public Opinion of Industry (October 1961) found that: Only
25% of stockholders say they can make a detailed analysis of a company from the balance
sheet and income statement, 43% say they get little or nothing from such statements, 32%
say they exact some meaning, id. at 2; only 50% are able to define assets; 70% cannot define
earnings, id. at 4; less than 50% can define depreciation, id. at 12; only 17% operating
revenues, id. at 14; 43o working capital, id. at 15; 5% cash flow, id. at 16; 5% funded
debt, id. at 32; 1% paid-in surplus, id. at 34; 131 par value, id. at 35; 4% debt capital,
id. at 36; and 3% equity capital, id. at 37. In addition only 64% of persons receiving said
reports even bother to look at them, id. at 4. But see Heller, "Disclosure Requirements under
Federal Securities Regulation," 16 Bus. Law. 302 n.6 (1961). The American investing class
contains a large number of inexperienced persons, 20th Century Fund, The Securities
Market 79-80 (1935), who are generally more speculative than investors of other countries,
id. at 83. With the expansion of the base of ownership in recent years, it is fair to assume
that these facts are even more true today. See Graham & Dodd, supra note 148, at 653;
Douglas & Bates, supra note 157; Barron's, pp. 5, 15 (Feburary 19, 1962).
160 Cf. Graham & Dodd, supra note 148, at 651.
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fact may not be controlling since under the Commission's present interpretation of the 1933 act, sales can be completed before a prospectus
need be delivered;161 and investors often do not even read prospectuses
anyway. 2 In all, it does not seem realistic to hold that purchase-by a
disorganized and 'unsophisticated group of investors should insulate the
promoter, especially when these sales are the very acts whereby these
purchasers first become part of the company.163
The essential consideration in deciding this point should be balance.
Assuming the continued need for public support of new businesses and
that the relatively unsophisticated investor, for the most part, will be
called upon to lend funds, it does not seem unreasonable to impose
some standard of fairness upon the promoter's activities. The promoter
is entitled to a just compensation which in many cases will be relatively
high, but in the isual case it is the public ..hichassumes all or
practically all of the monetary risk involved and for whose benefit the
corporation is supposedly functioning and the promoters working. Moreover, the public has a legitimate interest in these promotions both from
the standpoint of seeing that-new industries are developed and from the
standpoint of- the conservation of -capital. The attitude of our country
in the past has beef that investment decisions should be left to the
individual with no government interference. Unfortunately,- however,
in some cases this has amounted to saying, in effect, that the public's
capital is expendable. From an economic standpoint it may not suffice to
say anymore that laissez-faire rules of caveat emptor and supply and
161 See Op. Gen. Counsel, Sec. Act Release 2623 (1941), where the General Counsel ruled
that a prospectus can be delivered no later than with the confirmation. See also 1 Loss,
Securities Regulations 182 (2d ed. 1961).
102 See Demmler, "Private Suits Based on Violation of the Proxy Rules," 20 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 587, 598 (1959). Witness the following admittedly extreme example. Promoter A organizes Company B, and sells to it, for $15,000, property which cost him $10,000 three days before.
Company B makes a public offering in which it intends to sell 1,000 shares. The company
discloses in its prospectus that the price paid to the promoter was not the result of armslength transaction. The first 1,000 persons approached reject the opportunity to purchase
Company B's stock because of the promoters' deal. Company B then changes its policy
and begins to solicit less sophisticated investors. The next 1,000 prospects, not knowing
anything about the $15,000 deal, purchase one share each and the company sends a
prospectus to them when confirming the sale. Assuming no misleading statements were
made during the sales campaign, the act would not subject anyone to liability. But is there
any question that the promoters have made off with $14,000 for no apparent good reason?
Is it not reasonable to assume that this happens to a more or less degree in many
promotional offerings?
163 It should be recalled that the prospective purchaser does not have a wide choice when
buying stock in a promotional company. Indeed, he really can either buy the stock and
accept the promoters' bargain or refrain completely from purchasing stock in the company,
but if disclosure were to constitute notification there would be no way to purchase stock
and yet refrain from approving the promoters' deal. Compare holdings that disclosure made
at a shareholders' meeting is of no effect where proxies on the bulk of shares have been
previously solicited. See Hornstein, Corporation Law & Practice § 329 n.81 (1959), citing
Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933) (dissenting opinion); Berendt v. Beth
lehem Steel Corp., 108 N.J. Eq. 148, 154 AtI. 321 (Ch. 1931).
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demand are desirable or even adequate means of ensuring capital necessary to ensure satisfactory development of new businesses especially
where the need has already been proven great. 164 Contrary to this it would
seem not to be too harsh a burden to impose a simple test of fairness
upon the promoter's activities. Although some degree of freedom of contract might be lost, still it is apparent that at present there is a certain
lack of equality of bargaining power in favor of the promoter in the
usual case and the broad standards suggested here would certainly offer
adequate protection to the promoter.
Assuming such a standard were desirable and feasible, where could
the public look for protection against promoter's excesses? Theoretically
at least, the 1933 act is designed to compel disclosure only. State law
does provide some likelihood that even assuming compliance with the
1933 act, the public could receive protection from a grossly unfair
financing arrangement, since many states empower their officials to consider the fairness or merits of an offering. 165 In addition, several of the
of stock a promoter
states have specific provisions limiting the percentage
1 66
promotion.
the
in
receives for his participation
Under general principles of state corporation law relief might be possible since the typical promoters' fraud is bottomed on a breach of
fiduciary duty owed by the promoter to the corporation (although it is
frequently accomplished by means of a failure to disclose 6 '), and fraud
for corporate law purposes has traditionally encompassed situations
other than the strict meaning of the word,'168 including inequitable treatment such as a deprivation of preemptive rights' 69 or the sale of control
164 See footnote 152, supra. In addition there have been recent attempts to express a
concern for the public's interest with regard to the promotion of the corporation for the new
communications satellite. See S. Rep. No. 1584, H. Rep. No. 1636, to accompany H.R. 11040,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
165 Loss & Cowett, Blue Sky Law 36-37 (1958) (expressing doubt whether in fact the
states are more paternalistic than the 1933 act).
166 See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code §§ 25507, 25508, article 7.1. In Crawford, 'Promoters Compensation-Domestic and Foreign," 23 Cinn. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1954), it was said that custom
and usage seem to agree and acquiesce:
[Tihat anything up to ten percent of the common stock was once considered fair compensation to promoters who merely conceived the plan for the enterprise. However, if
the promoter owns the principal assets of the business . . . and acts as banker he may
rightfully take as much as fifty-one percent, thus ensuring his control of the corporation.
See also Berger, "Real Estate Syndication: Property, Promotion, and the Need For
Protection," 69 Yale L.J. 725, 782 nn.245, 248 (1960).
167 Strictly speaking, secrecy is not the basis for the promoter's liability. Rather, disclosure would only seem to bear upon the question of whether the promoter can be excused
from liability for his actions in contravention of his fiduciary duty. Compare Isaacs,
"The Promoter: A Legislative Problem," 38 Harv. L. Rev. 887, 893-94 (1925).
168 Compare Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431-33 (1909); People v. Federated Radio
Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 154 N.E. 655 (1926).
169 Failure to protect premptive rights breaches a fiduciary duty because it constitutes
inequitable discrimination, which situation resembles in some respects the promoters' fraud.
In Elliot v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 523, 80 N.E. 450, 452 (1907), the court said:
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to persons who intend to rob the assets of the corporation.""
Pipelife Corp. v. Bedford 71 seems to be the first state case specifically
concerned with whether compliance with the disclosure requirements of
the 1933 act forecloses relief under state provisionsYt2 The court held
that in view of the state constitutional and statutory provisions which
prevented the issuance of shares without adequate consideration, it did
not.1 73 Interestingly, the Pipelife case involved the question of whether a
corporation, once freed of the bonds of the promoters, could avail itself
of the watered stock remedies provided by state law, in order to recover
from the promoters; the court found it could. If one were to apply the
Chancellor's logic one step further to the typical promoter's fraud case, it
would mean that disclosure would not bind the corporation but would
permit review of the promoters' actions by an independent board of
directors.17 4 Such a holding would be welcome.
However, to depend upon relief from state law is not always wise because some states have not been able to provide real protection to the
public either because of inadequate statutory authority or enforcement
capabilities. It is therefore desirable to examine the federal securities
laws. Under federal law the problem becomes more difficult, because of
7 5 Of course, it is
the underlying philosophy of the 1933 act of disclosure.Y
not advocated here that the Commission be given authority to pass upon
the merits of a particular offering. Yet by the same token disclosure should
not be construed as eliminating recovery under other sections, as such with
the antifraud provisions, because in at least one respect the 1933 act
is not designed to require a revelation of all information respecting the
promoters' dealings, which may be highly relevant to the question of a
7
promoter's fraudY.1
The directors of a corporation act in a strictly fiduciary capacity. Their office is one
of trust and they are held to the high standard of duty required of trustees. They
cannot be permitted so to manage the affairs of their cestuis que trust that the system
of business corporations by which so large a part of the world's work is now con-

ducted, "may become a system of frauds."

170 Keystone Guard v. Beaman, 264 Pa. 397, 402, 107 AtI. 835, 837 (1919). See generally Leech, "Transactions in Corporate Control," 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 725 (1956).
171 145 A.2d 206 (Del. Ch. 1958). In McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d
Cir. 1961), in ruling that state security of expenses statutes do not apply to actions under
Rule lob-5, the Third Circuit had before it a complaint which alleged a fraudulent deprivation of preemptive rights as a violation of Rule 10b-5. 292 F.2d at 826.
172 Although the disclosure made in Pipelife, supra note 171, was in compliance with

Reg. A and not a full registration, this difference was not a significant factor in the case.

173 See footnote 171, supra.
174 There would still remain certain practical considerations such as when does a board
become independent? Assuming this question can be answered, there is a very strong likeli-

hood that the promoters would continue to control the company.
175 The question of legislative change, although providing a possible answer, will not be
discussed herein.
176

For instance, the disclosure requirements do not require that the promoters' cost to

be disclosed unless he transferred it to the company within the last two years nor is it
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Under such circumstances it is submitted that section 10(b) could
apply because the defendant's conduct might be fraudulent irrespective
of his compliance with the disclosure requirements. Here especially
"fraud" refers not to the strict common law situation but is considered
to encompass inequitable situations."
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to suggest
the outer limits of "fraud" as used in Rule 10b-5, it seems clear to the
present author that in situations where there is a substantial disparity of
information between insiders and the public, the rule should apply. It
is difficult to articulate hard and fast rules in this area because of the
variety of circumstances in which problems arise, but this should not
hinder a recognition that substantively "fraud" as used in Rule 10b-5 is
very broad. The difficult task is drawing a consistent and meaningful
distinction between profit-seeking conduct considered proper and that
whereby an insider improves his own position at the expense of the
public by reason of information not readily available. It is submitted
that every time there is this substantial disparity of information the
insider's conduct is similar to the common law conscious concealment of
a material fact, the only difference being, at most, one of degree and not
necessary even to indicate the promoters' compensation, direct or indirect, unless the
company was organized within the last five years. See Form S-1, Item II; Form S-3,
Item 12.
177 Note, 71 Yale L.J. 736, 737 (1962). In McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F.2d
824 (3d Cir. 1961) although the court did not pass on the merits of plaintiff's Rule lob-5
allegations, it appears clear that the court felt these provisions should apply where there
have been breaches of fiduciary duty, or other intracorporate abuses by management. It
said, inter alia:
[T]he federal provisions [§§ 10(b), 29(b)] are part of a new statutory scheme which
had as its purpose the creation of a new federal law of management-stock-holder
relations ...
That Act [Securities Exchange Act of 1934] deals with the protection of investors,
primarily stockholders. It creates many managerial duties and liabilities unknown to
the common law. It expressed federal interest in management stockholder relationships which theretofore had been almost exclusively the concern of the states. Section
10(b) imposes broad fiduciary duties on management vis-h-vis the corporation and
its individual stockholders. As implemented by Rule 10b-5 and Section 29(b), Section
10(b) provides stockholders with a potent weapon for enforcement of many fiduciary
duties. It can be said fairly that the Exchange Act, of which Sections 10(b) and 29(b)
are parts, constitutes far reaching federal substantive corporation law.
Id. at 834.
[T]here seems no rational basis for concluding that the right of action implied from
Section 10(b) bears a greater similarity to sections limited by security requirements
than it does to Section 16(b) which is unencumbered by that requirement. Indeed, a
persuasive argument could be made that the plaintiffs' complaint in the present case,
alleging as it does fraudulent dealing by insiders to the detriment of stockholders,
sounds as much in Section 16(b) as in any other liability section contained in the Acts.
Id. at 837.
In Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 764-65 (D.N.J. 1955), defendants had not disclosed their plans for the company whose stock they were attempting to purchase, which
would greatly enhance the value of the shares. Since they were not stockholders (even
though they held options to purchase shares and contingent proxy voting rights), and had
not received information from inside sources, it was held that they did not owe a fiduciary
duty to the selling stockholders.
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of kind. Rule 10b-5, however, by emphasizing that fraud is comparable
to a breach of fiduciary duty, should provide the necessary force to shift
the burden from the public to the insider which was not usually so at
common law.
The important point to be made is that disclosure should not insulate
the promoter, and the matter should be left open to examination on a
case by case basis.
There would appear to be some justification for such a holding. The
courts have taken the attitude that acts which constitute violations of
the disclosure requirements also constitute violations of Rule 10b-5.
This suggests that these -sections operate independently of each other
and that Rule 10b-5 is much broader than the specific civil liability provisions which provide remedies if there is a failure to disclose. In addition,
the three leading cases which have dealt with the problem of what constitutes a fraud within the meaning of the 1934 act involved essentially
a breach of fiduciary duty." 8 In addition the rule has been applied
broadly to cover a wide range of situations. 7 9
Concerning the more difficult aspect of whether 10b-5 could perhaps
be utilized to check promoters' excesses occasioned by a grossly unfair
situation, more caution must be exercised. At the present time there is
no direct support for such relief under either the 1933 act or the 1934
act; indeed such an interpretation would raise fundamental and serious
questions which might conflict with the philosophy of the 1933 act. 80
However, considering that promoter's fraud does constitute not only
economically and socially undesirable conduct but also a breach of
fiduciary duty, it is perhaps possible that given the proper circumstances
Rule 10b-5 can be invoked to provide relief.' 8 '
178 See Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Hughes v.
SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944). These antifraud provisions apply irrespective
of whether the particular security or transaction is exempt. See Sargent, "Pledge and
Foreclosure Rights Under the Secutrities Act of 1933," 45 Va. L. Rev. 885, 888 (1959).
179 See Cochran v. Channing Corp., Civ. No. 62-2597 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1962).
180 But cf. Pub. Util. Holding Co. Act of 1935 § 11; Investment Co. Act of 1940 (S. Rep.
No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 11-12; H. Rep. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 10 (1933).
181 Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 92 (1943). Even though it was conceded that
corporate officers had made full disclosure and had paid a fair price for the stock they
purchased, such act could be prohibited as not constituting a fair and equitable plan. The
Court said that "abuse of corporate position, influence, and access to information may
raise questions so subtle that the law can deal with them effectively only by prohibitions
not concerned with the fairness of.a particular transaction."

